A little more than a year after the signing of the Abuja I peace agreement, a new meeting was convened on 17 August 1996 in Abuja, Nigeria. The six Liberian belligerents and the representative of the LNC attended the meeting. The meeting was to discuss the progress of the Abuja I peace agreement. At the end of the meeting, it was decided to draft a new peace agreement. The new peace agreement covered three important issues: the draft also examined allegations about the importance of different implementation sub-goals and their role in general failure and failure. Such assertions gained momentum in the 1990s, when several international non-governmental organizations lobbied public opinion and governments and stressed that their only concern – whether it was disarmament, elections, human rights or the return of refugees – was critical to successful implementation. Two important results are derived from a study of the sub-goals and overall success of implementation. First, with respect to what can be achieved in each sub-objective, the wishes must be consistent with the resources and strategies authorized. In all dimensions, we can speculate on the perfect conditions under which elections should be held, on the need for a peace full of responsibility and the continuation of past atrocities and war crimes, or on the need for all refugees to return to their homes of origin. However, in the absence of resources and troops, ambitious standards for partial objectives are symbolic declarations of virtue and not practical means of ending wars. Second, investments in partial objectives should be the demobilization of soldiers and the demilitarization of politics, that is, the transformation of warring armies into political parties. Without these two sub-goals, civil wars cannot be fine-fought and important normative objectives such as the establishment and consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights are unlikely to succeed. At the end of the day, it is important to consider the results of the peace agreements as successful, unsuccessful or mixed.

The evaluation is anchored in two main indicators. To what extent the content of a peace agreement has been implemented.